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CONFIRMATION AS CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING:
LESSONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT FROM
THE CLARENCE THOMAS CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS
DONALD P. JUDGES*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Thomas's nomination and confirmation as the 106th Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court, like the Bork hearings,
has prompted critical reexamination of the judicial confirmation
process. Objections include: that the process has become too
politicized and sensationalized; that such intense public scrutiny
discourages qualified individuals from seeking the position; that
the President's nominees are excessively ideological; that senators
either try too hard to obtain commitments from nominees on sub-
stantive legal questions or do not try effectively enough; and that
insufficient attention is paid to nominees' qualifications.1 Further,
apart from the confirmation process, the Thomas hearings have
focused national attention on the issue of sexual harassment. All
of these are important issues, and many are ably discussed else-
where in this colloquium. These comments will address none of
them.
Instead, I will discuss the opportunity Justice Thomas's confir-
mation experience created to provide some much needed con-
sciousness-raising for at least one member of the Supreme Court
on the issues of privacy, individual liberty, and fairness. The
weight attached by the Justices to such interests assumes consider-
able importance under the Supreme Court's balancing approach
to constitutional interpretation. That approach, which the Court
applies at both the right-recognition stage (categorical balancing)
and the infringement-determination stage (more ad hoc balanc-
* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.
See Henry Reske, Confirmation Hearings, Round II, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1991, at 14.
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ing), often involves the weighing of competing interests. An in-
creasingly conservative Court is striking that balance with a corre-
spondingly diminishing concern for the powerful ways in which
government affects people's lives. The Court's opinions prompt
speculation about the extent to which the Justices' personal insula-
tion from the effects of many such challenged laws shapes their
views of the interests at stake. One explanation for the sometimes
startlingly insensitive statements of some Justices when disposing
of claims of individual liberty, privacy or fairness2 may be that
they have difficulty identifying with the position of the claim-
ant-especially outsiders such as an indigent pregnant woman
seeking an abortion or a death-row convict.' Consequently, their
conception of the factors that weigh in the constitutional balance
becomes skewed against claims of individual rights and in favor of
governmental interests. And an essential element of fairness-the
decision-maker's ability or willingness to appreciate the perspec-
tive of both sides-is substantially eroded.
The newest Justice, however, has now publicly stated that he
has derived a fresh appreciation for the values of privacy, liberty,
and fairness from his experience as a subject of government
processes during his confirmation hearings-which inquired in lu-
rid detail into his alleged sexual overtures toward a female
subordinate.4 He has also stated that he believes such inquiries to
2 See infra notes 11, 20, 25-27, 34-36 and accompanying text.
I This tendency is at the core of the problem in recent Establishment Clause cases. See,
e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989)
(invalidating placement of nativity scene on Grand Staircase of Allegheny Courthouse with-
out camouflage of plastic reindeer; but upholding menorah display outside City-County
Building next to Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (sustaining municipal sponsorship of nativity scene in park, accompanied
by other Christmas display items such as models of reindeer and Santa Claus house); see also
Donald P. Judges, Keeping the Faith?: The Lower Courts' Dubious Interpretation of Lynch v.
Donnelly and Stare Decisis, 24 U. Wvo. LAND & WATER L. REV. 167 (1989) (criticizing Lynch
as insensitive to perspective of non-Christians, and criticizing "two-plastic reindeer rule" as
cynical trivialization of constitutional protection).
' The tenor of the controversy is illustrated by the tabloid coverage of the hearings. See,
e.g., Chanda Howell, Sex Harassment Scandal: The Private Life of Anita Hill: A Woman Who
Can't Find Love, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 29, 1991, at 34 (example of just how lurid spectacle
became); Dan McDonald, Sex Harassment Scandal: Judge Thomas Told One Lie After Another
• . . and Anita Hill Is Telling the Truth, Voice Stress Test Proves, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 29,
1991, at 31 (same); Joe Mullins, The Bizarre Cult Past of Thomas' Wife, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct.
29, 1991, at 34 (same).
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be "unAmerican," and has asserted a right not to have certain
areas of his life invaded by government officials. Justice Thomas's
assertion of a new-found concern for privacy, liberty, and fairness
is especially significant in view of the apparent decline in judicial
empathy on the Court for claimants of such interests.5 Whether
that concern will endure or will go the way of some of Justice
Thomas's other public pronouncements remains to be seen. At
the least, however, his comments occasion a glance at the Court's
approach to determining the constitutional moment of various as-
pects of privacy, liberty, and fairness.
The claims asserted by Justice Thomas during his confirmation
hearings resemble in several important respects those asserted by
litigants before the Court in recent cases. If Justice Thomas's new
conception of fairness includes the most basic Kantian principle of
universality, then perhaps he will display more empathy with the
plight of the outsider than his critics predicted. Unless Justice
Thomas is prepared to explain why he is more entitled than other
individuals to privacy, liberty, and fundamental fairness, simple
norms of integrity and consistency in discourse would seem to de-
mand that he strike the constitutional balance further toward re-
spect for such claims than his colleagues have done.
Initially, this Article will set forth briefly the relevant portions
of Justice Thomas's testimony from his confirmation hearings.
Second, this Article will review a selection of recent Supreme
Court cases involving claims that bear significant parallels to the
claims asserted by Justice Thomas during his confirmation hear-
ings, and will contrast the results in those cases with the position
taken by Justice Thomas in his own behalf. In short, I argue that
in several important respects the claims advanced by the losing
individuals in each case were at least as compelling, and often
more so, than Justice Thomas's corresponding claims. Finally, I
conclude that several of Justice Thomas's first votes on the Court
already have called into question the strength of his proclaimed
commitment to individual rights.
I See Don J. DeBenedictis, Confirmation Conversion?: Thomas Backs Away from Former
Stands; Democrats Question Process, 77 A.BA. J 18, 19 (Nov. 1991).
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I. THE HEARINGS
The Thomas confirmation hearings shed far more heat than
light on the question of what kind of person Justice Thomas really
is, what he believes in and stands for, and what actually transpired
between him and Anita Hill. Although the hearings were rich in
descriptions of his impoverished childhood in Pin Point, Georgia,
Justice Thomas's "unartful dodges" on the issue of privacy and
his recanting of earlier strongly expressed views on abortion, in-
terbranch relations, women's rights, and natural law, left the pub-
lic mystified about his approach to some of the most important
constitutional issues of our time. Further, because the Senators'
questioning of Justice Thomas concerning Ms. Hill's allegations
consisted mainly of speeches and apologies, and because Justice
Thomas was perhaps one of the few persons in the entire United
States who did not observe her televised testimony and therefore
was conveniently positioned to avoid answering her charges in any
detail, the October 11-12, 1991 hearings provided more titillating
theater than fact-finding.
The one point that emerged forcefully and unambiguously
from the proceedings, however, is that Justice Thomas found the
hearings deeply offensive and humiliating. A sample of the more
than one dozen statements that he made in objection during the
October 11-12 hearings illustrates the extent to which Justice
Thomas claims to prize "fairness" and his privacy, and his pas-
sionate identification of those interests with "fundamental" values
that he regards as truly "American":
This [process] is not American; this is Kafkaesque. It has got
to stop. It must stop for the benefit of future nominees and
for our country. Enough is enough.
I'm not going to allow myself to be further humiliated in
order to be confirmed. I am here specifically to respond to
allegations of sex harassment in the workplace. I am not here
to be further humiliated by this committee or anyone else, or
to put my private life on display for prurient interests or
other reasons. I will not allow this committee or anyone else to
probe into my private life. This is not what America is all about.
To ask me to do that would be to ask me to go beyond fundamen-
tal fairness.
Vol. 7: 147, 1991
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I think the country has been hurt by this process. I think we
are destroying our country, we are destroying our institu-
tions, and I think it is a sad day when the U.S. Senate can be
used by interest groups and hate mongers and people who
are interested in digging up dirt to destroy other people, and
who will stop at no tactics when they can use our great insti-
tutions for their own political ends. We are gone far beyond
McCarthyism. This is far more dangerous than McCarthyism.
At least McCarthy was elected.
You are ruining the country. If it can happen to me, it can
happen to anybody, anytime, over any issue.6
A person enduring Justice Thomas's ordeal might be expected
to react in at least one of two ways. He or she probably either
would come away a wiser person firmly committed to procedural
and substantive fairness and to the vigorous protection of privacy
and individual liberty, or would emerge embittered and with
scores to settle against "interest groups" (some of whom coinci-
dentally are dedicated to preserving those very same values). One
who associates neo-conservatism with victim-blaming would not be
surprised to see Justice Thomas take the low road. At the hear-
ings, however, he reassuringly situated himself on the high
ground:
The other thing I've learned in the process are things that
we discussed in the real confirmation hearings, and that is
our rights being protected, what rights we have as citizens of
this country, what constitutional rights, what-what is our re-
lationship with our government. And as I sit here on matters
such as privacy, matters such as procedures for charges
against individuals in the criminal context or civil context,
this has heightened my awareness of the importance of those
protections, the importance of something that we discussed in
theory-privacy, due process, equal protection, fairness
I have been an accused.
6 Thomas Supreme Court Confirmation: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102
Cong., ist Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (emphasis added).
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[My rights] were violated .... 7
At a time when a reconstituted Court is reweighing the consti-
tutional "protections" of "privacy, due process, equal protection,
and fairness," and when the judicial commitment to vigorous
preservation of those interests seems very much in doubt, Justice
Thomas's statements merit close attention. It is therefore worth-
while to compare the public declarations of a sitting Justice on
such interests when his own privacy and liberty were at stake, to
the Court's responses to such claims raised by other, less
powerfully connected individuals.
II. "PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND FAIRNESS"
In a number of recent cases, this comparison reveals stark con-
trasts between the privacy rights claimed by Justice Thomas and
those recognized by his colleagues on the Court for everyone else.
In many instances, the Court has rejected claims that would seem
much more compelling than those asserted by Thomas-and
sometimes based on reasoning that could charitably be described
as "Kafkaesque."
A. Privacy
One obvious example is Bowers v. Hardwick.8 Michael Hardwick
was arrested for engaging in a sexual act with another consenting
adult in his own bedroom. The act was entirely private, involved
no violence or coercion (as might be the case, for example, in un-
welcome sexual advances by a supervisor toward a subordinate),
and would have gone largely unnoticed by the community had the
police not intruded. Detailed criticism of the Court's rejection of
Hardwick's constitutional challenge to the Georgia sodomy statute
is beyond the scope of these comments. The point here is that it is
difficult to see how the Senate hearings intruded into Clarence
Thomas's privacy more than the Georgia police's raid of Michael
Hardwick's bedroom invaded Hardwick's.
7 Id.
- 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Vol. 7: 147, 1991
Consciousness Raising
Between the two individuals, it would seem that Hardwick had
far more justification to feel violated by government than did
Thomas. Hardwick was arrested and rudely thrown into jail by
police who made a point of informing his cell-mates of the nature
of his offense, which, as mentioned, was as private and self-regard-
ing as an act involving more than one person can be. Thomas, on
the other hand, was seeking an office of the nation's highest con-
stitutional trust; and the allegations against him involved a possi-
ble breach of his official responsibilities and coercive, abusive con-
duct plainly relevant to his fitness and competence to serve on the
Court. Hardwick's "crime" was, at worst, only that of being differ-
ent in an intensely private way. If the allegations against Thomas
are true, he violated the trust of his public office, exploited a posi-
tion of power to degrade and humiliate a subordinate, flaunted
the very laws he subsequently swore to enforce, and perjured him-
self before Congress. If government's call upon Thomas simply to
respond to allegations of such momentous public import treads
the outer boundaries of permissible intrusiveness, then surely
Hardwick's much more modest claim not to be incarcerated for a
far more "private" act ought to lie comfortably within the pro-
tected zone.
Thomas's assertion of a privacy claim and the Court's rejection
of Hardwick's claim are difficult to reconcile. First, the nature of
the government's action with respect to Hardwick was arguably
more serious: Thomas was seeking a job to which he could claim
no entitlement-not trying to stay out of jail. Second, Thomas's
objection is tied to the constitutional issue as the Court framed it
in Bowers and as his own quondam endorsement of a natural law
perspective also would see it: Thomas complained that the intru-
sion was unAmerican. In other words, he seemed to argue that
such intrusion into his private sexual life offended liberties that
"are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "'
Third, Thomas's invocation of privacy in the circumstances has
more in common with the dissenters' than the majority's concep-
I Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). In this
respect, both Hardwick and Thomas present claims based on the autonomy aspect of the
right to privacy.
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tion of the constitutional issue. Justice Blackmun objected that the
majority had too narrowly described the nature of the interest at
stake:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, than
Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch
obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a funda-
mental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.
Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the
right to be let alone."1
Similarly, giving Justice Thomas the benefit of the doubt, one as:
sumes that he was objecting to the public pawing of his private
sexual life, not asserting a right to engage in the secret sexual har-
assment of subordinates. Surely Michael Hardwick must wonder
how his interest in the privacy of his own sexual life is any less
"fundamental," and how the constitutional protection of that pri-
vacy is any less "American" than is the case for Clarence
Thomas's sexual activities.
B. Government Overreaching in General
In a more general sense, Thomas's confirmation hearings tem-
porarily placed him on the underside of government's enormous
power. For a time, part of his personal life was subject to the
mercies of government officials who could not be assumed to be
benevolent, reasonable, fair, or even in control of events. But
Thomas's experience was only a shadow of that endured by count-
less Americans in everyday encounters with their govern-
ment-especially the poorest Americans who must depend on
government for sustenance and necessary services. The Supreme
Court, however, has immunized many applications of government
power from constitutional review as the result of the Court's para-
digmatic conception of negative rights in the liberal legalistic con-
10 Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
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stitutional state." Once again, however, it is difficult to see how
Justice Thomas's objections to government overreaching stand on
stronger ground than the claims rejected by the Court.
The abortion funding cases exemplify the Court's negative
rights approach. In Harris v. McRae,'2 the Court upheld the Hyde
Amendment, which denies federal Medicaid funds to reimburse
the cost of all but a tiny number of abortions for women who oth-
erwise would be eligible for such aid, while providing funding for
childbirth."3 The Court concluded that although the Constitution
protects the limited negative right to an abortion, that protection
"did not translate into a constitutional obligation .. .to subsidize
abortions."' 4 The Court explained that:
although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's'exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not re-
move those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the lat-
ter category. The financial constraints that restrict an indi-
gent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of
constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product
not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but
rather of her indigency.'
There are several problems with the Court's reasoning. First,
the Court's distinction between state inaction and action is dubi-
ous. The state has affirmatively decided-indeed enacted a stat-
ute-to exclude from a comprehensive program of publicly
funded medical care the one medical procedure entitled to consti-
tutional protection. Surely, poor women who are, in effect, bribed
to choose childbirth over abortion could reasonably feel that the
" See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Dis-
advantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. LQ (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Judges,
Bayonets for the Wounded] (examination of impact of that paradigm on perpetuation of eco-
nomic and political isolation of American underclass); Donald P. Judges, Light Beams and
Particle Dreams: A Reexamination of the Individual Versus Group Rights Paradigm in Affirmative
Action, 44 ARK. L. REv. 1007, 1039-46 (1991) (consideration of impact of paradigm domi-
nating affirmative action debate on that group). The discussion, infra, notes 12-36 and ac-
companying text of the abortion funding cases and DeShaney are taken largely from Judges,
Bayonets for the Wounded, with the permission of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
' 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
"3 See id. at 326-27.
1" Id. at 315.
"8 Id. at 316.
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state has "done something" tangible and substantial to them.1"
Second, the Court's conception of the scope of state responsibility
is cramped. In other contexts, the law routinely intervenes to pre-
clude private parties from exploiting such vulnerabilities and to
protect important public policies. For example, recognizing the
distorting effect that gross disparities in bargaining power can
have on the validity of an ostensible choice and the need to pre-
vent overreaching, to shift the cost of accidents to one who can
better bear and spread them, and to deter wrongful and harmful
conduct, courts will decline to enforce unconscionable contracts,'
7
disclaimers of implied warranties, 8 and express assumption of risk
in some situations. 9 In such cases, courts properly reject the argu-
ment that the more powerful party is not responsible for the
weaker party's vulnerability. Instead, the relation between the
parties gives rise to minimal obligations of good faith, fair dealing,
and due care. Medicaid recipients and the state are hardly stran-
gers to one another, and it seems anomalous to ignore the reali-
ties of the power relationship when one of the parties is the state
and the threatened policy is of constitutional stature. The Court's
finding that the women's utter dependence on government for
their health care is constitutionally irrelevant is therefore uncon-
vincing." Similarly suspect is the Court's conclusion that govern-
16 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1346-47 (2d ed.
1988).
" See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir.1965) ("where the element of unconscionability is present at the time a contract is
made, the contract should not be enforced").
Is See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960) ("attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantibility and of the obliga-
tions arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its
invalidity").
19 See, e.g., Tunkl v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963)
(even though hospital may be selective in admitting patients, it cannot contract to release
itself from liability for negligence).
2 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980). The Court reaffirmed this princi-
ple in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, upholding a prohibition on the use of public
facilities or employees to perform abortions not necessary to save the mother's life. 492
U.S. 490, 519, 520 (1989). The Court has also applied this approach in the First Amend-
ment area, reasoning that the First Amendment constitutes only a prohibition on certain
kinds of government restrictions on speech, not an entitlement to the means to exercise
one's free speech rights. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461
U.S. 540, 548-51 (1983) (sustaining Internal Revenue Code's distinction between nonde-
ductibility of contributions to tax-exempt organizations that engage in lobbying and de-
Vol. 7: 147, 1991
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ment's decision to fund the course of treatment leading to the ir-
revocable nonexercise of a constitutional right does not inhibit
the exercise of the right.
To be sure, there may be something to the view that a legisla-
tive judgment that our society will be insensitive to the plight of
its least privileged and most vulnerable citizens is entitled to some
deference. But the Court's linear, mechanistic view of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the state effectively ignores
the pervasive and powerful ways in which government affects the
lives of individuals-especially the poor and the vulnerable. After
all, the Court bears the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the
insensitive-or even purely selfish-dominant faction is not al-
lowed to negate the rights of citizens unable to command political
support but no less worthy of protection.21
An extreme example of the Court's reasoning is Rust v. Sulli-
van. 2 2 The regulations upheld in Rust prohibit family planning
clinics that receive Title X monies from discussing abortion as an
option with their clients, even if the client requests abortion infor-
mation, and even if the provider believes such information to be
in the woman's best medical interests. 23 If a client requests abor-
tion information, the provider may. respond that "the project does
not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning
and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion. "24
The Supreme Court rejected both a free speech and an abor-
tion rights challenge to the regulations. In the Court's view, the
ductibility of contributions to organizations that do not engage in lobbying). See generally
TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1346-47 (critique of Court's approach in Harris v. McRae).
21 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally JOHN HART
ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-36 (1980) (Court's job when detecting law depriving
one of constitutional entitlement is to unblock stoppage).
2I 11 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
2I ld. at 1778. Instead, the health care providers are required to refer pregnant clients
to "appropriate prenatal and/or social services .... ." Id. at 1765 (citing 42 C.F.R. §
59.8(a)(2) (1991)). For seventeen years, the Administration had interpreted Title X of the
Public Health Service Act to allow "nondirective" counseling and referrals-intended only
to inform, not to persuade or to influence-on all courses of action in response to preg-
nancy, including prenatal care and delivery, infant care, foster care, adoption, and abor-
tion. See Program Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services, Public Health
Services of HHS, 1981, at 12-13 (requiring Title X projects to provide information on all
options of family planning). In February 1988, however, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services issued the regulations upheld in Rust. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1762.
42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5).
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administration had simply defined the Title X program as limited
to family planning and reproductive health exclusive of abor-
tion.26 In disposing of the First Amendment claim, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that the regulations
"do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relation-
ship," because "[t]he program does not provide post-conception
medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion
cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her."26
The Court concluded that the regulations do not infringe a wo-
man's reproductive freedom because: (1) the woman is left "in no
different position than she would have been if the government
had not enacted Title X"; and (2) "a doctor's ability to provide,
and a woman's right to receive, information concerning abortion
and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X
project remains unfettered."27 In short, in the Court's eyes, the
government's Title X program under the 1988 regulations is like
a canoe quietly slipping across a placid lake, leaving hardly a rip-
ple in its wake.
The Court's analysis provides important insights into the
Court's vision of the relationship between government, its pro-
grams, and citizens' lives. Only someone insulated from the effects
of the regulations could accept the Court's view of government's
role in women's health care. Title X is not a quiet canoe, it is a
monstrous battleship.28 These regulations and the Court's deci-
sion will unquestionably have an enormous impact, especially on
the health care received by low-income women: the dependency
that everyone has on his or her health care provider is magnified
2 See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772. Thus, the Court reasoned, the regulations involve "not a
case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project
grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of its scope." Id. at 1772-73.
The Court observed that providers remain free to speak out on abortion outside the scope
of Title X projects. Id. at 1774.
Ie ld. at 1776 (emphasis added).
I d. at 1777.
28 Title X is the largest single source of federal funding of family planning services, and
reaches an estimated 14.5 million women. Id. State of New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,
415 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone, J., concurring), affd sub noma. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.
Ct. 1759 (1991).
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for these women because of their poverty. 9 It therefore is disin-
genuous-indeed, "Kafkaesque"-to contend that women are in
the same position they would have occupied had there been no
Title X. Once government has provided ideologically slanted
medical information for Title X clients to rely upon, it has sub-
stantially intruded into and had a major impact on their lives. 0
Yet by asserting a distinction between indirect encouragement
and outright prohibition, a distinction made possible by the nega-
tive-rights paradigm, and by positing a largely hypothetical alter-
native avenue to the exercise of the right, the Court manages to
deny that the administration is doing something tangible and dras-
tic to the lives of these women and their health care providers'
ability to provide care.31
2 See id. (Cardamone, J., concurring) Approximately one-third of those women are ado-
lescents and ninety percent of all women served have incomes below 150% of the poverty
level. Id. For many women, their first visit to the Title X grantee is for pregnancy testing,
not for contraception. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53,
56 (1st Cir. 1990). Federal funds account for approximately one-half of the money received
by Title X clinics. Id. at 73 n.11.
"a These women are going to Title X clinics for medical assistance concerning reproduc-
tive matters. Like anyone, they depend upon their health care providers to give them can-
did and complete advice in the provider's best judgment, including referral for appropriate
treatment. Doctors are ethically and legally obligated to do no less. When the physician
remains silent concerning abortion or, what is worse, recites the Administration's dogma,
any reasonable person would be grossly misled "into thinking that the doctor does not
consider abortion an appropriate option for her." As Justice Blackmun observed in dissent:
The undeniable message conveyed by this forced speech . . . is that abortion nearly
always is an improper medical option. Although her physician's words, in fact, are
strictly controlled by the Government and wholly unrelated to her particular medi-
cal situation, the Title X client will reasonably construe them as professional advice
to forgo her right to obtain an abortion. As would most rational patients, many of
these women will follow that perceived advice and carry their pregnancy to term,
despite their needs to the contrary and despite the safety of the abortion procedure
for the vast majority of them. Others, delayed by the Regulations' mandatory prena-
tal referral, will be prevented from acquiring abortions during the period in which
the process is medically sound and constitutionally protected.
Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
It therefore is perverse to suggest that government has not interfered with the doctor-
patient relationship when it censors doctors in the treatment room, and prescribes an or-
thodox litany to be recited when patients request medically pertinent information. Neither
expressive nor reproductive freedom are protected when health care providers are allowed
to speak everywhere and to everyone except where and to whom it matters most.
" It comes as no surprise that Chief Justice Rehnquist would take this position. Al-
though even pro-abortion rights advocates must admit that Roe v. Wade is not without its
doctrinal difficulties, then-justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case revealed an obdurate re-
fusal to acknowledge that abortion implicates privacy at all. He disagreed that the notion of
privacy had any application to the abortion decision, which he characterized as a mere
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 7: 147, 1991
Another, especially tragic, application of the Court's model to
the condition of the vulnerable is DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Services. 2 While little Joshua DeShaney was in his
abusive father's lawful custody, the county maintained an adminis-
trative network that funneled all child-abuse information into it-
self, purported to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such mat-
ters, and actively monitored and dutifully recorded numerous
indications that Joshua was being badly abused. In fact, on one
occasion the county actually obtained temporary custody when
Joshua was admitted to the hospital with multiple bruises and
abrasions; but the county shortly thereafter persuaded the juve-
nile court to dismiss the child protection case and return Joshua
to his tormentor.
Despite such indicia of government involvement, the Court in-
voked its negative rights paradigm to conclude that the county
could not be held constitutionally accountable for its failure to in-
tervene before Robert DeShaney savagely-but all too predict-
ably-beat his four-year-old son into a state of permanent brain
damage."3 In the Court's view, "the Due Process Clauses generally
"transaction" between the pregnant woman and her physician. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 172-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One wonders whether he, or any man would
feel the same way about a prostate examination.
32 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
8 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. Another compelling example of government's role in child
abuse is Yaakov Riegler's fate at the hands of New York's child welfare system. See Celia
W. Dugger, As Mother Kills Her Son, Protectors Observed Her Privacy, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 10,
1992, at AI. Yaakov's case illustrates the painful emptiness of the Supreme Court's analysis
in DeShaney.
Yaakov, a retarded eight-year-old boy who stood a full three feet eight inches and
weighed all of forty-eight pounds, was beaten to death in 1990 by his mother, Shulamis
Riegler. Shulamis had beaten Yaakov's brother Israel into a coma in 1986, but both boys
were returned to their mother after spending several years in foster care. State supervision
of the family was terminated November 27, 1989, notwithstanding the fact that school
officials showed Yaakov's bruises that very same day to a city child abuse investigator, who
was "shocked." In March 1990, the city's Probation Department terminated its supervision
of Shulamis, uninformed about additional reports that she might again be abusing her chil-
dren. Over the next seven months, Yaakov was examined and sometimes treated for nu-
merous cuts, gashes, bruises, and trouble with his elbow that an autopsy later revealed had
been fractured. Yaakov's teachers made repeated, "frantic" appeals for Yaakov's protec-
tion to the child abuse investigator, the investigator's supervisor, and the state child abuse
hot line. On September 27, 1990, another investigator visited the Riegler home, found
burn marks on Yaakov, and was told by the boy that both his father and mother hurt him
but that his mother hurt him more. Two days later, Shulamis beat Yaakov into the coma
from which he never recovered.
It is difficult to conceive of a coherent system of constitutional accountability that could
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confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. 34
Thus, Robert DeShaney, not the county, ruined Joshua's life; and
government's role in placing Joshua in harm's way, faithfully re-
cording his numerous injuries and "suspicions that someone in the
DeShaney household was physically abusing Joshua," 5 and mono-
polizing his one avenue to relief, are. constitutionally irrelevant to
establishing the kind of relationship that would impose even a
minimal duty of care. 6
In other contexts, apart from cases directly raising the negative
rights problem, members of the Court have also demonstrated a
remarkable capacity to discount substantially or to overlook the
real-world impact of government action. Examples can again be
found in recent abortion rights cases. In Hodgson v. Minnesota,37
Justices Kennedy, White, Scalia, and the Chief Justice disregarded
uncontested findings of fact concerning the detrimental impact of
Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement in voting to sus-
tain the provision. 8 As the lower court found, almost all judicial
conclude, as DeShaney apparently would, that the city did not participate significantly in the
taking of little Yaakov's life. According to the New York Times account,
[w]hen Mrs. Riegler pleaded guilty ... Judge Francis X. Egiito condemned the city's
child protection system-a system whose goal is, where possible, to reunite children
with their natural parents-and the boy's doctor for not saving Yaakov's life. "It's
not just Mrs. Riegler who is guilty of the death of Yaakov," the judge said.
Id. at A16.
', DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 193.
36 Only in limited circumstances of actual confinement has the Court recognized the
kind of relationship that creates such a duty. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982). Indeed, it is unclear that Joshua's constitutional claim would have prevailed on a
due process claim even had a county official personally administered the beating. The
Court has held that government employees' intentional, random and unauthorized depriva-
tions of property, when a state tort remedy is available, do not violate due process. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
348 (1986) (Due Process Clause not violated by lack of due care of official, even if it causes
injury to one's liberty).
This approach forces nice questions about when a deprivation results from an established
state procedure rather than from the employee's random and unauthorized act. See, e.g.,
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990) (failure to apply involuntary admission pro-
cedures to visibly disoriented "voluntarily" admitted patient to mental health facility held
not "unauthorized," but instead pursuant to delegated authority).
37 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
" See id. at 2961-64. Those findings included the following: although the statute sought
primarily to protect minors' well-being by encouraging them to discuss their pregnancy
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bypass applications were granted: "The judges who adjudicated
90% of the petitions testified; none of them found any positive
effects of the law." 9 On the whole, the district court found the
evidence overwhelmingly established that the law failed to ad-
vance the state's interest in promoting the pregnant minor's wel-
fare or enhancing family integrity, but instead caused considera-
ble harm to the minor and her family. Nevertheless, those four
Justices, reciting platitudes about the state's interest in protecting
and fostering the parent-child relationship-and ignoring the
contemporary realities of divorce, separation, dysfunctional rela-
tionships, and abusive parents in many families-were willing to
defer to legislative judgment on the wisdom of the measure.40
In comparison to the foregoing examples, government's impact
on Clarence Thomas seems tame. In his case, government merely
raised questions and provided a forum for allegations. To be sure,
some of those questions and allegations were decidedly embarrass-
ing and even painful; and his reputation may have suffered some
permanent damage as he moves from one life-tenured position to
another. But, it is no denial of Thomas's sense of outrage to rec-
ognize that the irreversible and enormous impact of government
decisions on the lives of helpless and disadvantaged persons, who
with their parents, it also was intended to deter minors from choosing to terminate their
pregnancies; only half of the minors in Minnesota live with both parents and a third live
with one parent; the two-parent notification requirement had especially harmful effects on
both the custodial parent and the pregnant minor when the parents were divorced or sepa-
rated because of the forced involvement with the family of the absent parent; and the two-
parent requirement also had detrimental effects in two-parent families, especially when do-
mestic violence was a serious problem (notwithstanding the abuse exception, which few
minors found a practical alternative because of the obligation to involve the authorities).
Id.
A majority of the Court held that requiring both parents to be notified, whether or not
involved in the minor's upbringing, "does not reasonably further any legitimate state inter-
est." Id. at 2945. A different majority, however, upheld the statute; but those Justices
could not agree on the result. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, White, and the Chief Justice would
have upheld the notification requirement even without a judicial bypass. Justice O'Connor
concluded that the judicial bypass provision remedied her constitutional objection to the
two-parent notification requirement. As a result, the Minnesota requirement of two-parent
notification and a forty-eight hour waiting period, coupled with the right to a court order
authorizing an abortion without parental notification, was upheld. Id.
s Id. at 2940.
40 Another example is Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2981
(1990), in which Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, uncritically sustained patently bur-
densome procedural hurdles for access to judicial bypass of a single-parent notification
requirement.
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must rely on the state for protection and health care, raise at least
equally strong claims to privacy, liberty, and fairness. Allegations
of sexual harassment, if baseless, are wrongfully damaging and of-
fensive. The alleged harasser's life, like any other wrongfully ac-
cused person, is adversely affected in a substantial way. But brib-
ing, misleading, and hounding indigent or young women in an
effort to lead them to bear unwanted children, and isolating
Joshua DeShaney in his patent victimization, inflicts damage no
less real, and ought to occasion no less cause for concern.
C. Fairness
Recent criminal procedure cases provide further instances of
the Court's disregard for the fairness claims of individuals who
are subjected to state authority. In each case, the Court's willing-
ness to privilege the abstract interests of the state over the claims
of individuals reflects an absence of even minimal empathy with
the claimant. In the Court's habeas cases, the Justices' psychic dis-
tance from the claimant manifests itself in an increasingly perva-
sive resistance to the merits of claims of patent violation of consti-
tutional rights. Once again, the Court's conclusions and reasoning
do not compare favorably with Justice Thomas's position. As dis-
cussed below, following the description of several recent cases, it
is difficult to see how-in terms of the interests to be included on
both sides of the balance-Justice Thomas stood on firmer ground
than did the unsuccessful claimants before the Court.
Reaching the merits in recent Fourth Amendment cases, the
Court has shown itself remarkably unwilling or unable to identify
with the position of the less powerful. For example, Justice
O'Connor concluded for the Court in Florida v. Bostick4' that a
person confronted by armed police in the confines of a bus, pursu-
ant to a police practice of routinely approaching bus passengers to
search their luggage, could "feel free 'to disregard the police and
go about his business,' " and therefore did not necessarily feel
compelled to submit to the search. "2 She reasoned that the indi-
vidual's "movements were 'confined' in a sense, but this was the
41 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
42 Id. at 2386 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991)).
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natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about
whether or not the police conduct at issue was coercive." '43 The
suggestion seems to be that any coercion derived from the individ-
ual's ill-advised choice to take a bus (instead of, one assumes, a
private jet or personal automobile), and not from the decision of
the armed officer to tower over him in a narrow, cramped corner
of a bus. One also suspects that of everyone involved in the case,
including the officers themselves, perhaps only the Bostick major-
ity-whose members probably rarely, if ever, ride buses and
whose encounters with armed officers most likely are limited to
bodyguard services provided by federal marshalls-believes that
the encounter was not inherently (and perhaps not intentionally)
coercive.
The Court's recent penchant for expediting executions and for
restricting federal habeas corpus review provides an especially
vivid illustration of the Court's resistance to judicial empathy.
One example is Coleman v. Thompson.4 In that 1990 Term case,
the Court upheld denial of federal habeas review of Coleman's
death sentence on the ground that he had procedurally defaulted
on his federal claims because his lawyer filed his notice of appeal
from his state habeas proceeding three days late. Justice
O'Connor's opinion reflects an exclusive concern with the state's
interest in federal noninterference. This concern is evident from
her first words for the Court-"This is a case about federal-
ism"'s-to her analysis of the adequate-and-independent-state-
ground doctrine for federal habeas review in cases involving a de-
fendant's procedural default in state court and her application of
the cause-and-prejudice standard to Coleman's case. She never
once takes account that a man's life is at stake.46
Justice O'Connor's relentless solicitude for the state's interests,
by contrast, dominates her opinion. She commences her opinion
43 Id. at 2387.
44 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
45 Id. at 2552.
41 Indeed, the only mention that the case involves Coleman's execution is in a two-sen-
tence recitation of the original proceedings below. The only mention of justice is in a pass-
ing reference to the third prong of the exception to the procedural default rule: that the
defendant can avoid the consequences of his or her default by demonstrating "that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at 2568.
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with a paean to the virtues of procedural default rules. Next, in
rejecting Coleman's argument that the federal-ground presump-
tion of Michigan v. Long"7 and Harris v. Reed' ought to apply
when a defendant presents federal claims to the state court, she
worries exclusively about the burden imposed on a state court
when it is merely required, "in the course of disposing of cases on
its overcrowded docket," to provide a clear statement of its reli-
ance on an adequate and independent state ground.'9 Justice
O'Connor concludes that allowing as sufficient "cause" attorney
error that produced the procedural default, even if such error
would have amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel in the original proceeding or direct appeal under Strick-
land v. Washington,5" would intolerably require the state to "bear
the cost of any resulting default and the harm to state interests
that federal habeas review entails." 51 Therefore, "[a]s between
the State and the petitioner, it is the petitioner who must bear the
burden of a failure to follow state procedural rules"-even if that
burden is imposition of the death penalty in violation of defend-
ant's constitutional rights.52
As Justice Blackmun observed in dissent, the majority's ap-
proach is an "unjustifiable elevation of abstract federalism over
fundamental precepts of liberty and fairness." He further stated:
Federalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state
resources; certainty; the majority methodically inventories
these multifarious state interests before concluding that the
plain-statement rule . . .does not apply to a summary order.
One searches the majority's opinion in vain, however, for any
mention of petitioner Coleman's right to a criminal proceed-
ing free from constitutional defect or his interest in finding a
forum for his constitutional challenge to his conviction and
sentence of death . . . .Rather, displaying obvious exaspera-
tion with the breadth of substantive federal habeas doctrine
and the expansive protection afforded by the Fourteenth
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
' 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
, Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2559.
50 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
' Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2567.
8' Id.
165
Journal of Legal Commentary
Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness in state
criminal proceedings, the Court today continues its crusade
to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims.5 3
The Court's overwhelming dedication to the interests of final-
ity-as opposed to constitutionality-in state criminal judgments
reached its zenith in McCleskey v. Zant.14 Warren McCleskey was
convicted of the murder of an off-duty policeman during a rob-
bery. The state's key witness was Offie Evans, who occupied the
jail cell next to McCleskey and testified that McCleskey admitted
shooting the officer. McCleskey argued in his second federal
habeas proceeding that Evans's twenty-one page signed statement,
which the state had withheld until one month before that hearing,
established that the state had used Evans to elicit inculpatory ad-
missions from McCleskey in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel under Massiah v. United States.5 For the Court,
the issue was whether McCleskey had "abused the writ"--not
whether Georgia should be allowed to abuse a human being and
the Constitution by executing someone whose rights plainly had
been violated, simply because he was insufficiently prescient in un-
covering evidence that the state itself had withheld. Speaking
through Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that the same "cause
and prejudice" standards applicable to procedural default cases
are to be applied to abuse of the writ. The Court also held that
abuse of the writ can be established through excusable neglect
and not just deliberate abandonment of a constitutional claim.
The Court further concluded that the "cause" element requires
petitioner to show that some "external" force interdicted his abil-
ity to discover the violation, and apparently believed that decep-
tion by the state is not such a force. Justice Kennedy's reasoning
in reaching these conclusions, presaging Justice O'Connor's Cole-
man opinion, is all finality, federalism, and conservation of scarce
judicial resources; it breathes not a word about the importance of
preserving constitutional rights. The Court's balance thus places
Id. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I II1 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
6 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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not a thumb but both feet on the state's side of the scale; and the
Court fails to pay even lip service on the scale's other side to the
writ's raison d'etre.
The Court's application of its vigorous new rules evidences its
commitment to the result they ultimately obtained in McCleskey.
Because McCleskey himself was a party to the conversations con-
tained in Evans's statement, the Court reasoned, he "had at least
constructive knowledge all along of the facts he now claims to
have learned only from the twenty-one page document."" Find-
ing no "cause," the Court never reached the "prejudice" element;
but it did conclude that no "miscarriage of justice"" occurred.
That exception is limited to conviction of an innocent person. Be-
cause the trial court found Evans's testimony credible, the Court
was convinced that no harm was being done in any event.
As the dissent pointed out, however:
[t]he majority's analysis of this case is dangerous precisely be-
cause it treats as irrelevant the effect the State's disinforma-
tion strategy had on counsel's assessment of the reasonable-
ness of pursuing the Massiah claim. . . . [I]n this case, by
withholding the 21-page statement and by affirmatively mis-
leading counsel as to the State's involvement with Evans,
state officials created a climate in which McCleskey's first
habeas counsel was perfectly justified in focusing his atten-
tions elsewhere. The sum and substance of the majority's
analysis is that McCleskey had no "cause" for failing to assert
the Massiah claim because he did not try hard enough to
pierce the State's veil of deception."
The dissent further observed that, in view of the centrality of
Evans's testimony to the state's case, its exclusion under Massiah
very likely would have led to a different outcome at trial.
The troubling denouement to this drama graphically illustrates
the consequences of the tilt in the majority's account of the inter-
" McCleskey, 11I S. Ct. at 1473. McCleskey relied on the testimony of a jailer, whose
relevance to the case McCleskey's attorneys did not discover until they obtained Evans's
statement, to show that the state had indeed planted Evans and used him to induce inculpa-
tory testimony. d.
Id. at 1474.
Id. at 1488 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ests at stake. The interest in expeditious executions was satisfied
with a vengeance. The Court handed down its McCleskey opinion
on April 16, 1991. On Monday, September 23, 1991, two jurors
from McCleskey's trial testified to the Georgia Board of Pardons
and Paroles, McCleskey's last hope, that they would not have
voted for the death penalty had they known that Evans was a po-
lice informant whose testimony may have been influenced by the
prospect of a lighter sentence.59 Shortly after 3:00 A.M. on
Wednesday, September 25, 1991, after a flurry of futile last-min-
ute appeals (one of which nightmarishly saw McCleskey put into,
taken out of, and replaced in the electric chair), Georgia suc-
ceeded in electrocuting Warren McCleskey.60 Finality, in the
strongest possible sense, thus was brought to McCleskey's case; the
writ is safe from further abuse by him. Whether justice was done
is another matter. It appears that the United States Supreme
Court has sanctioned the execution of an individual whose consti-
tutional rights were plainly violated as a consequence of the state's
affirmatively misleading defense counsel about facts that jurors
themselves testified would have changed the outcome.
The interests of finality, repose, timeliness, and orderly proce-
dures are important; and, as Justice Kennedy observed in McCles-
key, those interests serve all litigants in the system, including those
facing capital trials. It is, of course, essential that criminal offend-
ers be brought to justice. But, the Constitution constrains the
weight of those interests by embodying normative commitments
of a higher order: how we treat individuals in the criminal justice
69 See Peter Applebome, Man Whose Appeals Shook the Courts Faces Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1991, at A18. That testimony is relevant to both the Massiah claim and to Mc-
Cleskey's claim under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that the state failed to
disclose an agreement to drop certain charges against Evans in exchange for his inculpa-
tory testimony. McCleskey raised his Giglio claim in his first federal habeas petition and
received a favorable ruling from the District Court. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338,
381-82, 384 (N.D. Ga. 1984). That grant of the writ, however, was reversed by the Elev-
enth Circuit, which held that the state had not made such a promise to Evans and that the
error was harmless in any event. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 884-85 (1 1th Cir.
1985). The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit, and also ruled that Georgia's
capital sentencing procedures were constitutional, notwithstanding McCleskey's showing
that imposition of the death penalty might be statistically related to the victim's race. Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
0 Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate Is Executed After "Chaotic" Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1991, at AI0.
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system matters in a most fundamental way.
Ensuring that nominees to the nation's highest court are profes-
sionally qualified and ethically fit to serve is an interest of prime
importance as well. Society also plainly has an undeniable interest
in protecting and vindicating the rights of victims of sexual har-
assment. But Justice Thomas reminded us during his hearings, as
Oliver North and Edwin Meese also reminded us when they faced
unpleasant accusations, that we must not compromise our commit-
ment to basic fairness simply because the stakes are high and the
case is sensational. One might therefore sympathize with Justice
Thomas's objection at the unfairness of being confronted years
after the alleged fact with an especially elusive kind of allegation.
It is difficult to see, however, how Thomas's asserted interest in
fairness should receive greater weight than, say, Warren McCles-
key's. It does not diminish the subjective significance of Thomas's
own sense of indignation61 or the importance to him and society
of fairness, relevance, and accuracy in the confirmation process to
observe that McCleskey had the stronger claim. All McCleskey
asked of the Supreme Court was an opportunity to show how the
state had plainly violated his constitutional rights and then with-
held evidence of that violation, where such evidence very well
might have made the difference between life and death. Both the
condemned and society have a powerful interest in procedural
punctiliousness in capital cases, especially when, as McCleskey
himself unavailingly argued in his first trip to the Supreme Court,
there is reason to suspect that racial bias taints the sentencing
process.6 2
Comparison of the two claims, of course, must maintain per-
spective. Thomas was not charged with a crime, nor was he even
formally accused of sexual harassment. No charges against
him-civil or criminal-were ever filed. And sexual harassment,
ugly as it is, of course lies moral light-years away from armed rob-
61 One wonders whether his experience will lead Thomas to reconsider his position that
the feelings of one whose rights have been violated, for example, by racial discrimination,
are constitutionally irrelevant. See Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Consti-
tution: the Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983, 989-
91 (1987).
6 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279-80.
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bery and homicide. But just as the allegations against Thomas
were manifestly less grave than those against McCleskey, so too
were the consequences of the process government imposed on
him. As Thomas himself repeatedly observed during his hearings,
he was free at any time to walk away from the nomination and
return to his impregnable position as "the youngest member of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit." Unlike McCles-
key, Thomas could say that "I'll go back to my life of talking to
my neighbors, and cutting my grass, and getting a Big Mac at Mc-
Donald's, and driving my car, seeing my kids play football. I'll
live. I'll have my life back.""3 To be sure, he probably would have
suffered severe disappointment and embarrassment; but he would
still have his life, liberty, and job.
Any unfairness inflicted on Thomas is also of a different order
than the violation of McCleskey's rights. The "staleness" of the
allegations against Thomas did not result from any wrongdoing
by the powerful apparatus of the state; indeed, the Senate stu-
diously resisted even addressing the allegations openly until forced
to "take them seriously" by the pressure of public opinion. Mc-
Cleskey, by contrast, sought an opportunity to show that the state
had withheld constitutionally relevant evidence in a capital case.
Thomas's objection is further counterbalanced at least in part by
his own former agency's official recognition that, because of the
degrading nature of the violation, victims of sexual harassment
may not come forward with a complaint for a long time and may
maintain an apparently positive relationship with the accused."4
e Hearings, supra note 6.
64 See EEOC Policy Guidance, N-915.050, Empl. Prac. Rep. (CCH) % 5258, at 6924-27
(Mar. 19, 1990) (footnotes omitted). As the EEOC has stated:
While a complaint or protest is helpful to charging party's case, it is not a necessary
element of the claim. Indeed, the Commission recognizes that victims may fear
repercussions from complaining about the harassment and that such fear may ex-
plain a delay in opposing the conduct . . . . In appropriate cases, the Commission
may make a finding of harassment based solely on the credibility of the victim's alle-
gation. As with any other charge of discrimination, a victim's account must be suffi-
ciently detailed and internally consistent so as to be plausible, and lack of corrobora-
tive evidence where such evidence logically should exist would undermine the
allegation. By the same token, a general denial by the alleged harasser will carry
little weight when it is contradicted by other evidence.
Id. Indeed, the Commission has stated expressly that "[i]f the investigation exhausts all
possibilities for obtaining corroborative evidence, but finds none, the Commission may
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Finally, comparison of the racial discrimination claims raised by
both men further illustrates the contrast. Thomas characterized
Ms. Hill's allegations that he had boasted of his sexual endowment
and prowess as "charges that play into racist, bigoted, stereo-
types," and he objected that "these are the kind of charges that
are impossible to wash off ... . "65 While one might quarrel with
Justice Thomas's objection that it is inherently stigmatizing to be
accused of being sexually well-endowed, he is doubtless correct
that "we still have underlying racial attitudes about black men and
their views of sex." In any event, Thomas's claim of racism seems
puny next to McCleskey's unsuccessful assertion that statistical dis-
parities in the imposition of the death sentence reflect the ulti-
mate in racial injustice.
In sum, Thomas's confirmation hearings gave at least one Jus-
tice an opportunity to experience firsthand what it feels like to
have his privacy invaded, his character questioned, and his life dis-
rupted by government officials in the performance of their official
duties. His protests are understandable, but they pale in compari-
son to far more compelling claims recently rejected by the Court.
One of the most persuasive witnesses in Thomas's favor, Dean
Guido Calabresi, expressed optimism at Thomas's capacity to
grow and learn from experience as a Justice. Justice Thomas's
confirmation ordeal was a substantial first lesson, which, if learned
well, could go far to alleviate his critics' concerns. If Justice
Thomas meant what he said both about individual rights and em-
pathy with such claimants, and if he is willing to universalize the
norms deriving from those perceptions, then consistency and in-
tegrity would seem to require him to take a more liberal position
than the Court currently demonstrates.
III. THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME?
Unfortunately, early indications are not encouraging. One of
make a cause finding based solely on a reasoned decision to credit the charging party's
testimony." Id. at 6927 (footnote omitted). The Commission went on to state that a " 'bare
assertion' of sexual harassment 'cannot stand without some factual support.' To the extent
this decision suggests that a charging party can never prevail based solely on the credibility
of her own testimony, that decision is overruled." Id. at 6927 n.18.
s6 Hearings, supra note 6.
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Justice Thomas's first votes on the Supreme Court, albeit without
opinion, belies his professed new-found faith in procedural fair-
ness. His dissenting opinion in a recent Eighth Amendment case
calls into question his alleged sensitivity to the plight of the vic-
tims of abuse by government officials.
A. Fairness
In Collins v. May,66 Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia in voting against the denial of the state's
motion to vacate the Fifth Circuit's stay of execution of Justin Lee
May. 7 Although no fingerprints or other physical evidence linked
May to the robbery of a Western Auto Store in Freeport, Texas
in 1978, during which Jeanetta Murdaugh was fatally shot, he was
convicted of Ms. Murdaugh's murder and sentenced to death.
The state's case rested largely on the testimony of Richard Miles
and Oren Howard. Bullets recovered from the bodies of the vic-
tims were traced to a gun belonging to Miles. Facing an indict-
ment on two counts of capital murder, Miles testified that May
was his accomplice in the robbery and that May had shot Ms.
Murdaugh with Miles's gun.68 Howard testified at May's trial that
conversations with May and Miles while the three were in prison
together identified May as the killer.69
Both Miles and Howard recanted after May's conviction and
now alleged that their false testimony resulted from governmental
wrongdoing. Miles swore that he testified against May because "I
was afraid that if I didn't point the finger at May, they would pin
me on capital murder and I would be executed .... This is what
Captain Wagner [of the Freeport Police] told me, and I believed
him."'70 Miles stated that, during his cross-examination at May's
112 S. Ct. 576 (1991).
e Id. at 576.
08 Appellant's Brief at 6-7, May v. Collins, 1992 WL 33723 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-
6273).
"' The State also introduced corroborating evidence in the form of testimony by Robert
Dohle, who, based only on a fleeting glimpse of a man he had never seen before, identified
May six years after the event as having been in front of the Western Auto store sometime
earlier that day. Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
70 Id. at 9. Miles further swears that the police confronted him with a written statement
by May (which statement the state now denies exists) accusing Miles of the homicide. Id.
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capital murder trial, prosecutors renewed their threats to ensure
his adherence to his perjured testimony. Miles explicitly exoner-
ated May: "My testimony concerning Justin Lee May's involve-
ment was not true. While I was present, and was an eyewitness to
the offense, Justin Lee May was not present nor did he participate
in the offense in any manner. '7 1 Howard also stated that his testi-
mony was largely "a lie," which resulted from offers of reward
money by the prosecutors and fear that they would attempt to
blame him for the homicide.7 2 At the state habeas proceeding,
which involved no live testimony, the Texas court refused to
credit the affidavits of Miles and Howard repudiating their trial
testimony, and instead relied on affidavits by prosecutors and po-
lice denying that they engaged in the misconduct alleged by Miles
and Howard.
All May asked was an evidentiary hearing to resolve this new
disputed issue of material fact-which turns exclusively on the
credibility of the affiants. At the least, he requested an opportu-
nity to test by cross-examination the prosecutors' and police of-
ficers' self-serving denials. As May's counsel has argued:
If Miles' and Howard's affidavits are true, Justin May is inno-
cent and was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial .... If, as
Miles and Howard now state, the prosecutors coerced their
testimony, supplied false details to make it more believable,
and interfered with cross-examination by the defense, the
state prosecuted a man who should not have been charged in
the first place, deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial, and
thereby prevented the jury from seeing that he should be
acquitted. 3
Just a few hours before May's scheduled midnight execution, the
Fifth Circuit decided that the issue warranted full briefing and
therefore granted a stay. May remained at the executioner's door-
step until ten minutes before midnight, however, when the Su-
preme Court finally denied the State's motion to vacate the stay.
The legal issue for the federal courts in May was whether the cir-
" Id. at 10.
"Id. at 11.
78 Id. at 17.
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cumstances of May's case were sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption of correctness of state court findings.7" Given the
centrality of the credibility issue, and the absence of live testimony
or cross-examination in the state court habeas proceeding, May's
claim to an evidentiary hearing was a legitimate one."5 The only
question for the Supreme Court, which Justice Thomas answered
in the negative, was simply whether the Fifth Circuit should be
allowed to decide whether May would receive a hearing.
B. Abuse by Government Officials
Another disturbing example is Justice Thomas's dissent in Hud-
son v. McMillian.7" Two Louisiana prison officials, Jack McMillian
and Marvin Woods, manacled and shackled inmate Keith Hudson
and walked him toward an administrative lockdown area. On the
way there, "McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest,
and stomach while Woods held the inmate in place and kicked
and punched him from behind. ' 77 Arthur Mezo, the supervisor
on duty, watched and encouraged McMillian and Woods by telling
them " 'not to have too much fun.' "78 Hudson suffered bruises;
swelling of his face, mouth, and lip; loosened teeth; and a cracked
dental plate. The Magistrate characterized Hudson's injuries as
"minor" and awarded damages of $800.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that the
excessive use of force against an inmate that constituted unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain, when administered maliciously
and sadistically, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. Although the Court found the ex-
tent of injury relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it as-
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) (reliable written determination by state court pre-
sumed correct).
" As this article was going to print, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the issue was "debatable
among jurists of reason" and granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal. May v.
Collins, 1992 WL 33723, at *7-8. The court vacated the stay, however, concluding that
even assuming May had established a "colorable showing of factual innocence," the state
court's factual findings-even though based only on a paper record-were entitled to a
presumption of correctness. Id. at 9-15. This presumption was a key factor in the court's
conclusion over both May's trial and the State habeas proceeding. Id. at * 14.
76 1992 WL 30619 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992) (No. 90-6531).
7' Id. at *2.
Id. (citation omitted).
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serted that this objective component "is therefore contextual and
responsive to 'contemporary standards of decency.' '"I Those
standards are always violated, the Court concluded, when prison
officials use excessive force maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm-regardless of whether the prisoner suffers "significant
harm"-provided that the harm is more than de minimis.80 The
Court therefore upheld Hudson's claim.
Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. In Justice
Thomas's view, it apparently is bad enough that the Court has
applied the cruel and unusual punishments clause to prisoner
treatment not inflicted as part of the sentence.81 But to extend the
Eighth Amendment to harms not objectively "serious" or "signifi-
cant," no matter how egregious the prison official's subjective cul-
pability, Justice Thomas complained, is "yet another manifesta-
tion of the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must
address all ills in our society." '8 2 For Justice Thomas, there is noth-
ing cruel or unusual about the unnecessary, malicious, and sadistic
beating of a handcuffed and shackled man, so long as the individ-
ual is hardy enough to come away without objectively serious
injury.
According to Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas thus rejected
the principle that "punishments 'incompatible with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety' or 'involv[ing] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'
are 'repugnant to the Eighth Amendment.' "3 Justice Thomas re-
jected any distinction between claims based on conditions of con-
finement and those based on excessive force. Again according to
Justice O'Connor: "To deny, as the dissent does, the difference
between punching a prisoner in the face and serving him unappe-
tizing food is to ignore the 'concepts of dignity, civilized stan-
dards, humanity, and decency' that animate the Eighth
Amendment. '"84
7I ld. at *5.
80 Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *10- 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at * 15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at *6 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)).
I' ld. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S at 102).
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C. Portents
Clarence Thomas's vote to vacate the Collins v. May stay and his
Hudson dissent are troublesome enough on their own merits, but
they are especially disturbing in what they portend. As his own
vigorous objections during his confirmation hearings imply, Jus-
tice Thomas of all people should appreciate the palpable injustice
of denying someone a fair opportunity to demonstrate that evi-
dence against him was fabricated, that he was framed by overzeal-
ous accusers, and that the key witnesses have recanted. Clarence
Thomas observed during his confirmation hearings that if such a
thing can happen to him, it can happen to anybody on any issue.
It seems fair to assume, .then, that Justice Thomas would agree
that if an affluent, respectable, politically connected man nomi-
nated to the United States Supreme Court can be falsely accused
of sexual harassment, then a poor man with a lengthy prison rec-
ord (including a guilty plea to another homicide) can be falsely
accused of homicide. The obvious lesson for an attentive pupil
would be the need for judicial vigilance to guard against such in-
justices, especially in capital cases.
Further, Justice Thomas seemed to have no trouble recognizing
violations of evolving standards of decency and the relevance of
outrageousness when government inflicted pain by probing sensi-
tive areas of his life. His Hudson dissent failed to explain, how-
ever, how such standards become unworkable and how outra-
geousness becomes irrelevant when the pain is physically inflicted
with malice on someone bound hand and foot'. He also failed to
explain how it is more objectionable for "hate mongers" and
others to use the United States Senate for their own ends than it
is for malicious and sadistic prison guards to use the Louisiana
Penitentiary for their evil purposes. To be sure, Justice Thomas's
dissent in Hudson concedes that "[a]busive behavior by prison
guards is deplorable conduct that properly evokes outrage and
contempt."85 The problem is that, his assurances to the Senate
I ld. at * 15. And he did object, as did Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, to the
Court's elevation of the subjective standard to require malice and sadism even in cases in
which institutional security is not at stake. Id. at *7-8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at * 1 3-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Judiciary Committee to the contrary notwithstanding, Justice
Thomas's dissent blinks the connection between such outrage and
contempt, "our relationship with our government," and the need
for constitutional checks on governmental abuse. After all, it is
through such checks that society expresses its intolerance of espe-
cially deplorable conduct by public officials.
Following so closely on the heels of Justice Thomas's assertion
of strikingly similar claims, his vote in Collins v. May and his dis-
sent in Hudson v. McMillian therefore make it difficult to resist the
conclusion that Dean Calabresi's prediction was badly mistaken.
One is left to wonder just what Justice Thomas might have meant,
and indeed whether he meant anything at all, when he com-
plained bitterly of "people who are interested in digging up dirt
to destroy other people, and who will stop at no tactics when they
can use our great institutions for their own political ends,"8 and
when he said that his experience "heightened my awareness of the
importance of those protections . . . privacy, due process, equal
protection, fairness."8 Perhaps Clarence Thomas learned nothing
from the confirmation process after all about what privacy, lib-
erty, and fairness might mean to other people. In retrospect, how-
ever, other people are learning something about what those values
mean to him. And perhaps the lesson for us all is that what mat-
ters most is not how we choose our Justices, but whom we select. At
present, at least with respect to sensitivity to the values of fairness,
privacy, and liberty so passionately invoked by Justice Thomas in
his confirmation hearings, there appears substantial room for
improvement.
80 Hearings, supra note 6.
87 Id.

